



OCHA

## Stakeholder Analysis

Borno State, northeast Nigeria • Food insecurity

March 2017

Anna Lundberg, NOHA Groningen



## Key findings

The federal structure has hampered the humanitarian response.

All armed actors have a negative effective power.

More stakeholders assisting outside LGA headquarters are needed.

NEMA lack capabilities to contribute to an effective response.

The Nigerian Government is important to influence, and also function as a broker for OCHA

## Executive summary

The context in Borno State in northeast Nigeria is complex with many different stakeholders, whereof ten analysed within this brief. These includes armed, governmental, humanitarian and local actors, identified to have influence on or being affected by the food insecurity.

This briefing will identify key stakeholders and analyse their goals, capabilities and interactions in the timeframe of a snapshot. Through that allies and threats as well as structural holes in the network can be identified. The purpose is to guide OCHA Nigeria in its coordination of the humanitarian response, through understanding of relevant stakeholders and strategies on how to handle stakeholders and better achieve OCHA's goal.

## Context

The prolonged humanitarian crisis caused by the Boko Haram insurgency has had a devastating impact on food security in northeast Nigeria, most severely in Borno State. Borno has 1,5 million IDPs,<sup>1</sup> with 80% living in host communities.<sup>2</sup> With disrupted agricultural production, poor functioning markets and high food prices, the majority of the population are dependent on humanitarian assistance.<sup>3</sup> An estimated 3,3 million people are food insecure (IPC phase 3-5),<sup>4</sup> whereof 38 000 facing famine-like conditions (IPC phase 5).<sup>5</sup> These numbers are expected to significantly deteriorate during the lean season in June. The security situation and poor access is hampering the humanitarian response, and humanitarian actors focus on Maiduguri and LGA headquarters.<sup>6</sup> Operations often requires military escort or helicopters and the information on needs is poor.

## Stakeholders

### OCHA Nigeria

UN agency responsible for coordination of the humanitarian response in northeast Nigeria. OCHA is highlighting the lifesaving activities regarding food insecurity as the main priority of the response, despite other challenges, and is targeting the majority of the funding to the sector.<sup>7</sup> Even though OCHA is a coordinating body, it has great capabilities to facilitate and empower the response as well as influence general funding.

<sup>1</sup> WFP Nigeria, *Situation report #9*

<sup>2</sup> UNOCHA, *Humanitarian Needs Overview 2017 – Nigeria*, pp.7,10

<sup>3</sup> ACAPS, *Nigeria: Borno State Crisis Profile*

<sup>4</sup> ACAPS, *Nigeria: Borno State Crisis Profile*

<sup>5</sup> WFP Nigeria, *Situation report #9*

<sup>6</sup> ACAPS, *Nigeria: Borno State Crisis Profile*.

<sup>7</sup> UNOCHA, *Humanitarian Response Plan 2017 – Nigeria*, p.4

## World Food program (WFP)

UN agency who is co-leader of the Food Security Sector (FSS). Has scaled up its efforts and is primarily working with food assistance, now reaching over 1 million people monthly, but also cash-based transfers and special nutritious food.<sup>8</sup> Food security is one of its much prioritised issues, before the role within logistics, emergency communication and air services.<sup>9</sup> Further, WFP has great expertise and capabilities, but are depending on funding.

## Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)

UN agency working with food insecurity through medium-term assistance in collaboration with the Government. Assistance includes agricultural input and tools, livestock health and technical support.<sup>10</sup> The aim is to rehabilitate the agricultural sector and enhance resilience among affected people, and the emergency food insecurity is one issue within its broader work.<sup>11</sup> FAO is the co-leader of the FSS and has good capabilities, but its assistance require time to achieve results.

## Nigerian Red Cross Society (NRCS) and the Red Cross Movement

National NGO working with food insecurity in close collaboration with the international movement, distributing mainly emergency food rations but also agricultural input and livestock vaccinations.<sup>12</sup> Primarily focusing on IDPs and vulnerable households in hard-to-reach host communities, and has added value in access through NRCS's network of volunteers.<sup>13</sup> Food assistance is one issue among other such as health, WASH and protection. Having strong local acceptance and access,<sup>14</sup> it is however occasionally constrained by its refusal to use military escort despite security issues.<sup>15</sup>

## Federal Government of Nigeria

Responsible for national security and basic human rights with delegated authority to State governments, and leader of the FSS through Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. Nigeria has a large economy able to address the crisis, but has rather focused on military response<sup>16</sup> and been constrained by other challenges.<sup>17</sup> Rather than facilitating the humanitarian response, there is signs of disguising the needs by accusing aid organisations of exaggeration.<sup>18</sup> <sup>19</sup> Despite official commitment,<sup>20</sup> its overall motivation can be questioned and the Government assumingly want other actors to handle the food insecurity. The federal structure, incompatible with centralised humanitarian organisations, have delayed decision processes.<sup>21</sup>

---

<sup>8</sup> WFP Nigeria, *Situation report #9*

<sup>9</sup> WFP Nigeria, *Country Brief*

<sup>10</sup> Nigeria Food Security Sector, *Food Security Sector Bulletin November to December*, p.3

<sup>11</sup> FAO, *FAO in the 2017 humanitarian appeals - Saving livelihoods saves lives*

<sup>12</sup> ICRC, *Facts and Figures 2016*

<sup>13</sup> IFRC, *Complex Emergency Plan of Action Final Report - Nigeria Complex Emergency*

<sup>14</sup> ACAPS, *Crisis Profile: Northeast Nigeria Conflict*, p.5

<sup>15</sup> IFRC, *Complex Emergency Plan of Action Final Report - Nigeria Complex Emergency*

<sup>16</sup> Asfura-Heim and McQuaid, *Diagnosing the Boko Haram Conflict: Grievances, Motivations, and Institutional Resilience in Northeast Nigeria*, p.45

<sup>17</sup> ACAPS, *Crisis Profile: Northeast Nigeria Conflict*, pp.5-6

<sup>18</sup> Akinwotu, *Nigeria's president accuses UN of hyping up humanitarian crisis for \$1bn appeal*

<sup>19</sup> Premium Times, *Nigeria faces no threat of famine – Agric Minister Ogbeh*

<sup>20</sup> UNOCHA, *Humanitarian Response Plan 2017 - Nigeria*

<sup>21</sup> ACAPS, *Crisis Profile: Northeast Nigeria Conflict*, pp.5-6



## National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA)

Governmental agency responsible to coordinate and respond to emergencies at national level, as well as state level through its equivalents. The mandate and scope of crisis make the food insecurity important, but also other crisis draw attention. The agency lack funding, capacity and expertise to handle the prolonged humanitarian crisis, and have been struggling to scale-up.<sup>22 23</sup> Managing formal IDP camps, the agency has been overwhelmed and there has been reports of corruption and theft.<sup>24 25</sup>

## Nigerian Military

Tasked to defeat Boko Haram and has been advancing since increased operations 2015. In the long run the gains are enabling humanitarian response and recovery in newly assessable areas. However, insecurity remains in rural areas and security operations hamper humanitarian assistance and contribute to displacement, further exacerbated by tactics to weaken Boko Haram such as food blockages.<sup>26 27</sup> Due to fear of infiltration the military has restricted movements around camps,<sup>28</sup> and are also responsible for SGBV and human right violations.<sup>29</sup> The military is powerful, but also constrained by poor material, training and moral.<sup>30</sup>

## Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF)

Civilian self-defence groups established to protect communities, but later state-funded and joint with the military in fight against Boko Haram. Even though assisting in recovering areas, CJTF is also contributing to violence and is accused of vetting newly arrived IDPs, child recruitment and unlawful killing.<sup>31 32</sup> Their capabilities by themselves are estimated to be limited.

## Boko Haram (BH)

Militant Islamic group fighting in northeast Nigeria to establish an Islamic state, divided in two main factions. Having little to loose, Boko Haram is furiously fighting to achieve its goal, causing displacement and destruction seriously affecting agriculture and food insecurity. Boko Haram is locally funded, depending on extortion and taxation, plundering, cattle theft and abduction.<sup>33</sup> Being a powerful group, they are now under financial constraints and victims of their own food crisis.<sup>34 35</sup>

---

<sup>22</sup> ACAPS, *Crisis Profile: Northeast Nigeria Conflict*

<sup>23</sup> International Crisis Group, *North-eastern Nigeria and Conflict's Humanitarian Fallout*

<sup>24</sup> ACAPS, *Nigeria: Borno State Crisis Profile*

<sup>25</sup> Segun, *Boko Haram food crisis demands cooperation and accountability*

<sup>26</sup> ACAPS, *Nigeria: Borno State Crisis Profile*

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> ACAPS, *Crisis Profile: Northeast Nigeria Conflict*, p.13

<sup>29</sup> Human Rights Watch, *World report – Nigeria: Events of 2016*

<sup>30</sup> International Crisis Group, *Nigeria: The Challenge of Military Reform*

<sup>31</sup> International Crisis Group, 2016, *North-eastern Nigeria and Conflict's Humanitarian Fallout*

<sup>32</sup> Human Rights Watch, *World report – Nigeria: Events of 2016*

<sup>33</sup> UN Security Council, *Fourth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da'esh) to international peace and security*

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Searcey, *Boko Haram Falls Victim to a Food Crisis It Created*

## Traditional leaders

Community leaders and elders representing their community's interests within councils and towards the government, as well as mitigating role in conflicts.<sup>36</sup> Working for the good of their population, food insecurity is one of many issues. Traditional leaders have local respect and local networks,<sup>37</sup> but limited material resources.

## Analysis of Stakeholders

In order to analyse the stakeholders, the following matrix translate these descriptions into values regarding goal, salience, capability and effective power for each of them.

Stakeholder	Goal*	Salience*	Capability*	Effective power*
OCHA	+	0,8	3	2,4
WFP	+	0,8	4	3,2
FAO	+	0,6	3	1,8
NRCS	+	0,5	4	2,0
Government of Nigeria	+	0,1	3	0,3
NEMA	+	0,4	2	0,8
Nigerian military	-	0,6	4	2,4
CJTF	-	0,2	1	0,2
Boko Haram	-	1	5	5
Traditional leaders	+	0,6	1	0,6

\* Goals determines position on the issue. Assumes either (+), (-) or (0) depending on the effect on food insecurity.

Salience describe a stakeholder's willingness to invest its resources to achieve its goal, in comparison with other issues. Assumes a value ranging from (0) to (1).


Capabilities refers to a stakeholder's resources to achieve its goal, and determines the amount of power. Assumes a value ranging from (0) to (6).

Effective power = Goal × Salience × Capability

<sup>36</sup> Asfura-Heim and McQuaid, *Diagnosing the Boko Haram Conflict: Grievances, Motivations, and Institutional Resilience in Northeast Nigeria*, p.49

<sup>37</sup> Voices 4 Change, *Strategy on Working with Religious and Traditional Institutions and Leaders*, pp.4-5

The analysis can further be visualised in a graph with salience of the stakeholder and kind of effect on the horizontal axis and capabilities on the vertical axis.



Revealing the value of their goal and effect on food insecurity, armed actors are found on the negative side while other actors are found on the positive side. The humanitarian actors close to OCHA has relatively high effective power, and OCHA should continue to actively and closely engage with them. Boko Haram has the highest effective power and is therefore hard to negotiate with, posing a great threat to OCHA goal.

Analysing the graph from OCHA's perspective, some plausible strategical partnerships can be suggested. Firstly, the Nigerian Government with high capabilities but low salience has the power to either hinder or enable the humanitarian response, and should be engaged with to bring to OCHA's side. By advocate for awareness of the severity of the crisis, OCHA can increase its salience and improve the humanitarian response. Furthermore, this could also adjust the military's goal and salience in order to decrease their negative influence. By referring to common goals of security, increasing the protection of civilians would adjust their methods to do less harm.<sup>38</sup>

Secondly, the role of CJTF should be monitored. At the same time, the low effective power compared to OCHA as well as background make it the easiest armed actor to negotiate with. Involving them would improve support, and advocacy to adjusting their role into communal civilian protection in farming areas might change their effect on food insecurity.


Thirdly, NEMA has the national responsibility to manage the crisis and medium high salience, but its response is hampered by lack of capabilities. By further engaging with NEMA through capacity building as well as assistance with funding requests,<sup>39</sup> ensuring their support, NEMA is strengthened and becomes an essential ally to OCHA.

<sup>38</sup> Center for Civilians in Conflict, *Living through Nigeria's Six-Year Insurgency*

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

# Social Network Analysis

It is also essential to analyse the relations between the. Following figure visualise the network of stakeholders, with green lines representing cooperative relations and red hostile relations. The solid lines signal stronger relations than the dashed ones.



The humanitarian community, the local actors, the governmental actors and lastly, Boko Haram, forms four clusters and OCHA appears well-connected in its coordinating role. Seeing the extensive relations of NEMA, the agency is an important actor not only for the network but also for OCHA. This further supports the earlier suggested strategy to increasingly engage with NEMA to build its capabilities, seeing its possibilities also from a network perspective.

Further, there are structural holes between OCHA and the local actors. With inaccessible communities, it would be beneficial for OCHA to establish a relationship with the traditional and religious leaders. This would strengthen the relationship to the affected communities and improve reach as well as and accuracy of information. The Government could function as broker and facilitate the initial steps. Another way is to strengthen the cooperation with LNGOs, which have a strong connection to communities. Similarly to NRCS, LNGOs might have added value through local acceptance and greater, which is an

## Note on reliability

Because of the insecure and complex context with limited access in northeast Nigeria, the collected data risks to be incomplete and inaccurate. Furthermore, there is a general lack of available information, especially about national and local actors.

Even though the referenced sources are estimated to be reliable, it would have strengthen the analysis to be able to triangulate the information with other sources,

essential need in the response.

Lastly, OCHA does not have any cooperation with the CJTF, whom in prior analysis was identified as a possible armed actor to influence. A relation could be established with the Government as broker, however this would require a lot of resources from OCHA as the Government assumingly would be reluctant to refrain from CJTF's support.

## Recommendations

- Strengthen the capabilities of NEMA to build up the national response
- Advocate with the Government in order to increase its salience
- Address the structural hole to communities through engaging with local leaders as well as LNGOs
- Investigate a potential cooperation with CJTF concerning protection c
- Investigate how OCHA can improve the compatibility with the federal structure
- Appeal to donor countries to fund OCHA and WFP operations



## Sources

ACAPS, 2016, *Crisis Profile: Northeast Nigeria Conflict*. Available at:

[https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/assessments/160712\\_acaps\\_crisis\\_profile\\_northeast\\_nigeria\\_b.pdf](https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/assessments/160712_acaps_crisis_profile_northeast_nigeria_b.pdf)

ACAPS, 2016, *Nigeria: Borno State Crisis Profile*. Available at:

[https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/acaps\\_crisis\\_profile\\_nigeria\\_borno\\_state\\_161125\\_0.pdf](https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/acaps_crisis_profile_nigeria_borno_state_161125_0.pdf)

Asfura-Heim, Patricio and McQuaid, Julia, 2015, *Diagnosing the Boko Haram Conflict: Grievances, Motivations, and Institutional Resilience in Northeast Nigeria*. CNA. Available at: [www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA613302](http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA613302)

Akinwotu, Emmanuel, 2016.12.05, *Nigeria's president accuses UN of hyping up humanitarian crisis for \$1bn appeal*. The Guardian. Available at:

<https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/dec/05/nigeria-president-claims-un-united-nations-hyping-up-north-east-crisis-for-1bn-appeal-buhari>

BBC, 2017.11.01, *Nigeria Boko Haram crisis: Aid agencies 'wasting funds'*. Available at:

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38582457>

Center for Civilians in Conflict, 2015, *Living through Nigeria's Six-Year Insurgency*.

Available at: <http://civiliansinconflict.org/resources/pub/living-through-nigerias-six-year-insurgency>

FAO, *FAO in the 2017 humanitarian appeals - Saving livelihoods saves lives*. Available at:

<http://www.fao.org/emergencies/appeals/2017/en/>

Human Rights Watch, 2017, *World report – Nigeria: Events of 2016*. Available at:

<https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/nigeria>

ICRC, 2016, *Facts and Figures 2016*. Available at:

[http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/nigeria\\_2016\\_facts\\_figures.pdf](http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/nigeria_2016_facts_figures.pdf)

IFRC, 2016, *Complex Emergency Plan of Action Final Report - Nigeria Complex Emergency*. Available at:

<http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/MDRNG018fnr%5B1%5D.pdf>

International Crisis Group, 2016, *Nigeria: The Challenge of Military Reform*. Available at:

<https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/nigeria-challenge-military-reform>

International Crisis Group, 2016, *North-eastern Nigeria and Conflict's Humanitarian Fallout*. Available at:

<https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/northeastern-nigeria-and-conflict-s-humanitarian-fallout>

Nigeria Food Security Sector, 2016, *Food Security Sector Bulletin November to December*. Available at:

[http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/fss\\_nen\\_bulletin\\_nov\\_to\\_dec\\_2016\\_20170103\\_new.pdf](http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/fss_nen_bulletin_nov_to_dec_2016_20170103_new.pdf)

Premium Times, 2017.03.05, *Nigeria faces no threat of famine – Agric Minister Ogbeh*. Available at: <http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/225247-nigeria-faces-no-threat-famine-agric-minister-ogbeh.html>

Searcey, Dionne, 2016.03.04, *Boko Haram Falls Victim to a Food Crisis It Created*. The New York Times. Available at: [https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/05/world/africa/boko-haram-food-crisis.html?\\_r=0](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/05/world/africa/boko-haram-food-crisis.html?_r=0)

Segun, Mausi, 2016.12.01, *Boko Haram food crisis demands cooperation and accountability*. IRIN. Available at: <https://www.irinnews.org/opinion/2016/12/01/boko-haram-food-crisis-demands-cooperation-and-accountability>

UNOCHA, 2016, *Humanitarian Needs Overview 2017 - Nigeria*. Available at: [http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ocha\\_nga\\_2017\\_hno\\_13012017.pdf](http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ocha_nga_2017_hno_13012017.pdf)

UNOCHA 2016, *Humanitarian Response Plan 2017 - Nigeria*. Available at: [http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ocha\\_nga\\_hrp\\_2017\\_summary\\_16122016.pdf](http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ocha_nga_hrp_2017_summary_16122016.pdf)

UN Security Council, 2017, *Fourth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da'esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat*. Available at: <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N17/024/61/PDF/N1702461.pdf?OpenElement>

Voices 4 Change, 2014, *Strategy on Working with Religious and Traditional Institutions and Leaders*. Available at: <http://www.v4c-nigeria.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Religious-and-Traditional-Leaders-Strategy-Sept-2014.pdf>

WFP Nigeria, 2016, *Country Brief*. Available at: [http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Nigeria\\_CB\\_Feb-17%20OIM.pdf](http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Nigeria_CB_Feb-17%20OIM.pdf)

WFP Nigeria, 2017, *Situation report #9*. Available at: <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/WFP%20NIGERIA%20External%20SITUATION%20REPORT%20%239%2C%2020%20March%202017.pdf>